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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-851 




TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION LOCAL 106 (TRANSIT 
SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION CAREER & SALARY 
UNIT) and DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenors. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, LLP (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT K. DRINAN 
of counsel), for Employer 
COLLERAN, O'HARA & MILLS (EDWARD J. GROARKE of counsel), 
for Intervenor Local 106 
JOEL GILLER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARY J. O'CONNELL 
of counsel), for Intervenor DC 37 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the petitioner, the Transport 
Workers Union of America, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU) and the intervenors, the 
Transport Workers Union Local 106 (Transit Supervisors Organization Career & Salary 
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Unit) (Local 106) and District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (DC37). 
TWU filed a unit placement petition, seeking the placement of approximately 400 
professional and salaried computer and telecommunications employees1 of the 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) in its unit of 
hourly employees in operational or maintenance titles. Thereafter, Local 106 intervened 
to represent only supervisory employees among the petitioned-for titles and to have 
those titles placed in the units it represents of either operating supervisors or career and 
salary supervisors employed by MABSTOA. DC37 intervened on the basis of its 
representation of certain MABSTOA employees and its representation of certain 
employees of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), in the same titles as those 
covered by the instant petition. DC37 seeks the accretion of the in-issue titles to its 
MABSTOA bargaining unit. 
The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that neither TWU's unit, nor the 
intervenors' units were the most appropriate units for placement of the in-issue titles. 
EXCEPTIONS 
TWU excepts to the ALJ's determination that the in-issue titles and the titles in 
the unit represented by TWU do not share a community of interest sufficient to support 
placement of the titles in TWU's bargaining unit. Local 106 excepts to the ALJ's decision 
that certain of the petitioned-for titles are not supervisory employees and, therefore, do 
not share a community of interest with the titles in the supervisory units represented by 
1The titles covered by the petition are: computer aide, computer programmer analyst 
trainee, computer programmer analyst, computer associate (technical support), 
computer associate (operations), computer associate (software), computer typesetter, 
computer specialist (operations), computer specialist (software), telecommunications 
associate and telecommunications specialist. 
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Local 106. DC37 excepts to the ALJ's decision that the unit represented by DC37 was 
not the most appropriate unit in which to place the petitioned-for employees. DC37 
particularly objected to the ALJ's determination that the MABSTOA employees 
represented by DC37 shared no community of interest with the petitioned-for employees 
or the other titles represented by DC37 who are employed by the NYCTA, and that its 
representation of the NYCTA employees could not be considered in determining the 
most appropriate unit. Both Local 106 and DC37 also except to the ALJ's finding that 
the titles to be accreted to either unit were greater than 30 percent of the existing units 
and that, therefore, placement of the titles in either Local 106's or DC37's unit was 
inappropriate as a matter of law.2 MABSTOA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision and we adopt the factual 
findings therein.3 Such facts as are necessary for consideration of the exceptions are 
repeated here. 
TWU represents over 5,000 MABSTOA hourly employees in operational and 
maintenance titles. Local 106 represents approximately 500 MABSTOA supervisory 
employees in two separate units, one comprised of operating supervisors and the other 
which includes career and salary employees, primarily administrative assistants, who 
exercise some supervisory responsibilities. DC37 represents 105 MABSTOA 
employees in the titles of associate cashier (vault handler), transit customer service 
2
 See Ogdensburg City Sch. Dist, 31 PERB1J3060 (1998). 
3
 37 PERB H4003 (2004). 
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specialist I and II, assistant civil engineer representative and laboratory technician. Also 
represented by DC37 are computer programmers, computer aides and computer 
associates employed by NYCTA.4 
The titles in issue require advanced computer skills and knowledge, are salaried, 
annual positions with different terms and conditions of employment than those enjoyed 
by the employees represented by TWU. They do not have any significant supervisory 
duties similar to the employees represented by Local 106. Likewise, while some 
employees of MABSTOA represented by DC37 have technical skills, they are not 
telecommunications or computer specialists and do not share similar job duties and 
responsibilities. A DC37 local does represent employees who have identical titles and 
similar job duties and working conditions as the petitioned-for titles. However, those 
employees are employed by NYCTA, not MABSTOA. 
DISCUSSION 
As noted by the ALJ, we have held that a unit placement petition is a mini-
representation proceeding.5 In a representation proceeding, the statutory uniting criteria 
come into play and the ALJ must find initially that there exists a community of interest 
between the petitioned-for titles and the titles in the bargaining unit into which 
placement is sought. We find, as did the ALJ, that the MABSTOA employees in the 
units represented by TWU, Local 106 and DC37 do not share a community of interest 
4
 The collective bargaining agreement between attached to DC37's motion to intervene, 
shows that different locals of DC37 have been recognized to represent employees of 
NYCTA and MABSTOA in separate units. It appears that these separate locals and 
separate units are covered by one master contract, with some provisions of the 
agreement applicable only to employees of NYCTA or only to employees of MABSTOA. 
5
 State of New York, 36 PERB 1J3007 (2003). 
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with the MABSTOA telecommunications and computer specialist titles in issue such as 
would warrant placement of those titles in any existing unit. 
As we held in New York City Transit Authority,6 differences in the terms and 
conditions of employment, training, skills and job responsibilities between the petitioned-
for titles and the titles represented by TWU compel a determination that the petitioned-
for titles are not appropriately placed in TWU's unit. Likewise, the differences in the 
skills and training and the lack of supervisory responsibilities of the telecommunication 
and computer specialists covered by the petition support the ALJ's determination that 
these titles are not appropriately placed in Local 106's bargaining units. 
Finally, as to DC37, the ALJ correctly determined that the MABSTOA employees 
represented by DC37, while possessing some technical skills, do not share a 
community of interest with the petitioned-for MABSTOA employees in 
telecommunication and computer specialist titles. That a local of DC37 represents 
employees of NYCTA in similar titles does not support the placement of MABSTOA 
telecommunications and computer specialists in the unit of MABSTOA employees 
represented by DC37. In an early case,7 we determined that §1203-a.3(b) of the Public 
Authorities Law8 precludes us from treating MABSTOA and NYCTA as a single 
employer and accreting employees of one employer into a unit of employees of the 
other employer. MABSTOA, NYCTA and DC37 may have negotiated agreements 
covering employees of both employers represented by different locals of DC37, but that 
6
 36 PERB 1J3038 (2003). 
7
 MABSTOA, 10 PERB fl3094 (1977). 
8
 "Said officers and employees [of MABSTOA] shall not become, for any purpose, 
employees of the city or of [NYCTA]...." 
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does not compel us or authorize us to ignore the express language of the Public 
Authorities Law and cases decided thereunder.9 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by TWU, Local 106 and 
DC37 and affirm the decision of the ALJ.10 
As there is no appropriate unit placement for the MABSTOA telecommunications 
and computer specialist titles in the existing units represented by TWU, Local 106 or 
DC37, the petition is dismissed in its entirety. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
MichaeUR. Cuevas, Chairman 
a
 See Reis v. MABSTOA, 161 AD2d 288 (1st Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 
76NY2d707(1990). 
Given our decision on the merits of the petition, we have not reached the ALJ's 
alternate basis for dismissal based upon our decision in Ogdensburg, supra, note 2. 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-897 
BATH MUNICIPAL UTILITY COMMISSION, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ELLEN M. MITCHELL 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARRIS BEACH LLP (EDWARD A. TREVVETT of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions by the Bath Municipal Utility Commission 
(Commission) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting the unit 
placement petition of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), seeking to place the titles of office manager, line 
supervisor, utility service supervisor, utility maintenance supervisor, chief wastewater 
treatment plant operator, and accounting supervisor into its existing bargaining unit. 
The Commission opposed the petition and, in its response, alleged certain 
defenses, one of which alleged that the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
specifically excluded supervisors. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Commission filed exceptions to the ALJ decision alleging, inter alia, that the 
ALJ erred on the facts and the law and the ALJ failed to give adequate weight to the 
employer's uniting preference. CSEA submitted a response to the exceptions in 
support of the ALJ's decision. 
Bas^TTpoTTouTTevieWof theTecofd and th~e^rtie^'aTpmeTTt^~we reverse iM 
decision of the ALJ and dismiss the petition. 
FACTS 
The CBA between the Commission and CSEA covering the period June 1, 2001 
to May 30, 2004,1 provides as follows: 
Section III, entitled "Recognition", states that: 
The Commission recognizes the CSEA [s ic ] . . . as the sole and 
exclusive representative for all employees in the unit exclusive of 
part-time and/or temporary employees (i.e. hired for the months of 
May, June, July and August) and the supervisory staff, for the 
purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, work 
conditions and other terms and conditions of employment. 
Section IV, entitled "Collective Bargaining Unit", declares that: 
The CSEA unit represents all permanent employees holding a 
position by the appointment or employment in the service of the 
Commission, and as defined by Section 201 subdivision 8, Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, except the nine (9) supervisory 
staff positions. 
Section V, entitled "Definitions", defines at subdivision A6: 
Supervisory Staff: The Director of Municipal Utilities, the Assistant 
Director of Municipal Utilities, the Utilities Office Manager, the 
Utilities Operations Supervisor, the Departmental Supervisors, and 
the Secretary or Typist acting as secretary to the Director constitute 
the supervisory staff... It is the function and duty of these staff 
1
 Petitioner's Exhibit #7. 
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employees to implement and administer the policy decision of the 
Commission and the Village of Bath. 
The petition sought to include the titles of office manager, line supervisor, utility 
service supervisor, utility maintenance supervisor, chief wastewater treatment plant 
operator and accounting supervisor. 
The organization chart2 illustrates the various department heads as follows: the 
Director (Matthew Benesh), Office Manager (Shirley Edwards), Accounting Supervisor 
(Paul Webster), Overhead Line Supervisor (Daniel Nolbes), Utility Service Supervisor 
(Dale Hare), Underground Line Maintenance Supervisor (Guy McGlynn), and 
Wastewater Treatment Plant Chief Operator (Royce Hoad). Under each department 
head, the chart identifies the respective subordinate employees. 
Benesh testified on behalf of the Commission. His testimony, on cross-
examination, was limited to an admission that the Commission formulates the policies 
and mission of the Commission. His direct testimony described the functions performed 
by the several supervisors. He stated that, although he directs the policies of the 
Commission, he does not manage the departments on a day-to-day basis. He leaves 
management of the departments to the supervisors. Benesh instituted supervisors' 
meetings after he became Director. These meetings were intended to be interactive so 
that the supervisors could exchange ideas among themselves and with him.. 
He described the various projects each of the supervisors was involved with. 
Some of the projects were the result of the supervisors' recommendations that the 
Commission accepted while others may have resulted from a consultant's 
recommendation. Benesh gave as examples the computer project that Webster 
2
 Employer Exhibit #2. 
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recommended; the installation of substations recommended by Nobles' predecessor, 
which was completed with Nobles' involvement; the fact that Hare would be in a position 
to recommend the replacement of vintage gas equipment; the fact that McGlynn 
recommends which wells should receive maintenance; and that Hoad was involved in a 
major project involving the wastewater treatment plant in 1994. Also, Hoad decides to 
accept^n^jecTsrudg^frorri outside sources in"consulfa1ic^"wifrTeifrTeTBenesh or the 
Commission. 
Benesh developed the budget with the assistance of the supervisors and 
presented it to the Commission. The accounting supervisor, Webster, assisted this 
effort with aid of computer software. 
With regard to discipline, Benesh testified that, although there have been no 
discipline problems, the supervisors follow the CBA. The CBA, at section XXV, entitled 
"Disputes", describes the procedure to follow in order to resolve disputes. The 
employee is to first consult with his CSEA unit representative who will then "assist the 
employee and his department supervisor in reaching an amicable solution under the 
terms and conditions of this agreement." 
The department supervisor is the first step in the grievance process. Under 
section XXVI, entitled "Grievances", an aggrieved employee presents his grievance to 
his department supervisor informally. At this stage of the process, the department 
supervisor has the discretion to resolve the grievance without the intervention of the 
Director of Municipal Utilities. The department supervisor merely has to notify the 
Director of the resolution. 
Benesh described the procedure for an employee to receive an increment. 
Section XII, subdivision A(1) and (2) of the CBA, entitled "Increments", gives the 
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^ department supervisor the discretion to award an increment to an employee based upon 
adaptability and proficiency. 
Section X, entitled "Absence Without Leave", mandates that the department 
supervisor shall investigate and report the circumstances regarding absences to the 
Director of Municipal Facilities. In addition, the department supervisor may take such 
3J3gjpljnary actiorTas^he^deefhslTecessary. Se^tioTrXr,~WTtitleTi_"Oth^EmploymerTf; 
permits the department supervisor to determine whether an employee's outside 
employment is interfering with the performance of his or her duties for the Commission. 
Section IX, entitled "Sick Leave, Sick Leave Bank, Leave of Absence, Funeral 
Leave and Rest Periods", describes the negotiated procedure to be followed by 
employees. With regard to sick leave, each employee shall report absence because of 
sickness to the department supervisor. Paragraph 5 compels an employee taken sick 
or injured on vacation to submit a doctor's certificate to the department supervisor or 
Director of Municipal Utilities. Subdivsion E, entitled "Rest Periods", provides that 
coffee may be supplied to employees during a rest period at the job site at the discretion 
of the department supervisor. 
Benesh stated that he had no part in the decision to schedule employees for 
overtime work. The supervisors made that determination. With regard to performance 
evaluations, Benesh testified that supervisors have not evaluated their respective 
employees in the bargaining unit. He also acknowledged that he has not done an 
evaluation of the supervisors. 
The supervisors testified on behalf of CSEA. Nobles' testimony described his 
obligations under the CBA. He stated that he could not fire someone on his own. He 
y 
limited his role to the terms of the CBA. He said that he took no part in Commission 
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-x meetings nor did he have input into Commission policy. On cross-examination, Nobles 
stated that he was involved in hiring Mark Hawk. He interviewed Hawk and 
recommended to Benesh that the Commission hire Hawk. He also interviewed Jeffrey 
Smalt and he was subsequently hired. He described his role in the budget process. 
Nobles stated that he submitted his priorities to Benesh. Nobles stated that he has yet 
tQ-gg-jpVQlVea'-jn a grievance as a manager. ~ 
McGlynn testified generally about his duties. He noted that most overtime came 
on an emergency basis. He stated that he never participated in contract negotiations. 
On cross-examination, he stated that he decides when the third shift is scheduled to 
flush hydrants. He described his role in interviewing new hires within his department. 
He decides when to replace equipment. 
Hare testified about his job duties. He supervises eight people, some of whom 
"work on a 24-hour desk". He described how sick leave, vacation and overtime is 
processed. In response to the question, "[C]an you deviate from the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement when granting accrual time?" his response was "No". 
He acknowledged that he cannot hire or fire anyone by himself. He played no role in 
contract negotiations. On cross-examination, Hare described his involvement in hiring 
Steven Larsen and Donald Bates. Hare recommended and the Commission 
subsequently hired those two men. He described his role in the Buck Meadows project. 
This was a housing development and Hare recommended the amount of gas per pound 
that would run through the project. Hare used his judgment to make this 
recommendation which was subsequently followed. 
Webster testified that he does not supervise anyone directly. His job duties 
J 
generally consist of recordkeeping and keeping the books for the Electric Department. 
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He also does most of the information technology work. He does not purchase the 
computer hardware. He completes an order or requisition and gives it to Benesh's 
secretary. He troubleshoots the computer hardware whenever the need occurs. He 
stated that he has never read the files stored on employees' computers. He develops a 
monthly income expense statement as well as other financial data. These reports are 
Available'to the"public.~When askedlf he~was ever requested to~pfoduce a report with 
regard to CSEA salaries, he had no answer. The ALJ rephrased the question to 
assume a wage report generated for a three-year period that included percentage 
increases. Webster responded to the ALJ that he had not been asked to produce such 
a report. On cross-examination, Webster acknowledged that he produced Employer's 
Exhibit #7, a salary schedule that contains a comparison of salaries for the supervisors 
with steps and no longevity or longevity only. 
DISCUSSION 
We recently addressed the issue raised by the Commission in its exceptions. In 
Regional Transit Service,3 a unit placement petition was filed seeking the placement in 
the petitioner's bargaining unit of a title that had been specifically excluded from the 
bargaining unit by the language in the recognition clause of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. We reiterated our long-standing policy, first articulated in State of 
New York,4 and restated in County of Rockland,5 that 
[although public employers and employee organizations are 
encouraged to agree upon the composition of bargaining 
units, as well as the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees, when a representation dispute arises, PERB 
3
 35 PERB P022 (2002). 
4
 1 PERB 1J399.85 (1968) (subsequent history omitted). 
5
 28 PERB H3063(1995). 
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has the statutory duty, pursuant to §207 of the Act, to 
determine the most appropriate bargaining unit consistent 
with the criteria contained therein. Agreements between the 
employer and the employee organization regarding unit 
inclusions and exclusions are, accordingly, not controlling.6 
A unit placement petition is, in substance and effect, a mini-representation 
proceeding calling only for a non-adversarial investigation and the application of the 
statutory uniting criteria in §207.1 of the Act. We, therefore, consider this case in the 
context of our decisions determining whether a community of interest, or the potential 
for a conflict of interest, exists between the petitioned-for employees and the employees 
in the bargaining unit. The language of the parties' contractual recognition clause is not, 
therefore, dispositive in this analysis. 
We now turn to the facts of the case as presented by the parties and find that the 
in-issue titles have sufficient supervisory responsibilities such as to their placement in 
CSEA's unit inappropriate. 
CSEA contends that we should place supervisors in its unit because there is no 
prohibition against mixed units of supervisors and rank-and-file employees. While as a 
general proposition, that is correct, it is not the end of the analysis. In support of its 
argument, CSEA relies on our decision in County of Genesee (hereinafter, Genesee).7 
In Genesee, we stressed that it was not the supervisory status of the employee that was 
controlling, but the nature and level of the supervisory functions performed that would 
determine whether inclusion of supervisory titles in a unit of rank-and-file employees 
was appropriate. In Genesee, the head nurses and supervising nurses were not 
6
 Id. at 3143. 
7
 29 PERB H3068(1996). 
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- N fragmented from an existing unit of nurses because of the nature and level of 
supervision. It was determined that the head nurses and supervising nurse did not 
perform significant supervisory duties and responsibilities. 
CSEA also contends that the supervisors share a community of interest with 
other titles in the bargaining unit because they receive the same benefits as unit 
membefsTThis argumenfisTiotTpersuasiveTWhere theTe~is^potentiarfor conflict 
because of supervisory responsibilities, the fact that the supervisors share similar 
benefits with the rank-and-file employees does not compel the inclusion of supervisors 
in a unit of rank-and-file employees. 
On this record, the organizational chart depicts a vertical line of authority. 
Benesch's undisputed testimony established that he is not involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the various departments. The supervisors are the next level of authority 
on the chart and they function as the department heads. The contract language 
illustrates that they are directly responsible for the decisions that affect the rank-and-file 
employees' terms and conditions of employment. Under the terms of the CBA, they 
have the discretion to resolve grievances, award an increment based upon adaptability 
and proficiency, determine whether an employee's outside employment might be 
interfering with the performance of his duties for the Commission, receive reports from 
employees concerning their illness and doctors' certificates, schedule overtime and 
interview prospective employees. Nobles considers himself to be a manager. While the 
record does not support the Commission's contention that the supervisors are 
managerial, it is equally clear from these facts that these supervisors are high-level 
supervisors in this organization and not "mid-level" as found by the ALJ. 
J 
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When analyzing whether a community of interest exists, we must also look at 
whether there are any conflicts of interest inherent in a proposed unit which would make 
such a unit unacceptable or undesirable.8 We find it significant that the supervisors 
covered by the petition are responsible for the day-to-day operation of each department. 
It is not unreasonable, under the circumstances, to anticipate that whatever tension may 
be generatedbysuch supervision would complicate relaTionsh~ip^rJelweerTsupervisors 
and rank-and-file employees. While not dispositive of the issues raised here, the 
question also arises whether the supervisors would be adequately represented in a unit 
that is overwhelmingly dominated by rank-and-file employees. 
We have held that any questions under the community of interest criterion as to 
the appropriateness of the unit placement are removed upon application of the 
"administrative convenience" uniting criterion in §207.1 (c) of the Act. That criterion 
requires weight be given to an employer's uniting preference.9 Here, the Commission 
has contended that placing the supervisors into the CSEA unit would be inappropriate 
because of their duties and responsibilities and, therefore, the most appropriate unit 
would be a unit of supervisors. Given the level and degree of supervision exercised by 
the petitioned-for titles and the Commission's stated uniting preference, we find that a 
combined unit of these employees and the rank-and-file employees they supervise is 
not the most appropriate unit. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the Commission's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
8
 State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), 19 PERB 1J3008 (1986). 
9
 Town of Huntington, 33 PERB 1J3049 (2000); Malone Cent. Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3050 
(1998). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ ^Jvlarc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOO H. (SUSAN) TSUI, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NOS. U-22908 & U-22988 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
SOO H. (SUSAN) TSUI, pro se 
ROBERT E. WATERS, SUPERVISING ATTORNEY (ORINTHIA E. 
PERKINS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Soo H. (Susan) Tsui to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing two improper practice charges. The 
first charge (U-22908) alleges that the Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New York (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when, in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, it 
placed a disciplinary letter, dated June 18, 2001, and an unsatisfactory observation 
report, dated June 19, 2001, in her personnel file. Tsui's second charge (U-22988), 
dated November 30, 2001, alleges that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act when it terminated her employment. 
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The District submitted an answer to each charge that denied the material 
allegations and raised the defenses of timeliness and notice of claim.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
Tsui has excepted to the ALJ's decision on several grounds. We will address the 
principal exceptions that allege the ALJ erred in her analysis of the facts and law. 
Based on our revieWofllieT'ecorcraTidl^ 
affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
We adopt the ALJ's findings of fact2 and will reference only the facts as relevant 
to Tsui's exceptions. 
Tsui, a licensed social worker, was hired by the District to replace a retiring 
guidance counselor at Intermediate School (IS) 131, School District 2, in September 
2000. She began her work at IS 131 on September 5, 2000, and, in October 2000, she 
was informed by the principal, Alice Young, that her employment had been terminated. 
This caused Tsui to contact United Federation of Teachers (UFT) representative 
Richard Tokar, who interceded on her behalf with Young. Young agreed to provide Tsui 
with a letter of termination. At the time of her employment termination, Tsui was a 
probationary employee. 
Later in October 2000, Tsui contacted UFT representative for District 2 Stewart 
Cohen, and Ira Kurland, UFT representative for social workers and psychologists. They 
1
 The ALJ dismissed the District's notice of claim defense. As there were no exceptions 
taken to this ruling, we not address this issue. 
2
 36 PERB 1J4582 (2003). 
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prevailed upon the superintendent's representative, George Miller, to restore her 
employment and Tsui was able to return to IS 131 at the end of December 2000. 
In January 2001, Tsui was advised by Beverly Hershkowitz, guidance supervisor 
for District 2, that she would be observing Tsui conducting a counseling session on 
January 22, 2001. Hershkowitz gave Tsui an unsatisfactory evaluation. Hershkowitz 
"testifiecTtriaT Tsui's counseling~skills were ina^e^u^t^Hel^likowitz^he^ule^TsTIiToT" 
an intervisitation with a senior counselor. Tsui maintained in her testimony that she had 
been unfairly evaluated. 
On March 26, 2001, Hershkowitz conducted a second observation. Again, she 
gave Tsui an unsatisfactory evaluation. Hershkowitz noted that Tsui's counseling skills 
remained inadequate. Tsui disagreed with the evaluation and filed a grievance. Her 
grievance was denied at the step two hearing held on June 12, 2001, before Miller. 
Cohen and Kurland both testified that, prior to the step two hearing, Miller offered to 
withdraw the unsatisfactory evaluations in return for Tsui's resignation and agreement 
not to seek future employment in District 2. 
A third observation of Tsui was scheduled for June 18, 2001. This observation 
was conducted by Marjorie Robbins, Director of Pupil Personnel Services for District 2, 
and the administrator in charge of the guidance department. Robbins conducted the 
observation jointly with Hershkowitz. They were to meet with Tsui on June 14, 2001, to 
discuss their expectations. On June 14, 2001, Robbins and Hershkowitz observed Tsui 
arriving inappropriately late for her position. Hershkowitz sent Tsui a letter dated June 
18, 2001, reprimanding her for lateness. The letter was placed in Tsui's personnel file 
and Tsui filed a grievance. 
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The observation on June 18, 2001, started late because the students were 
involved with tests administered prior to the session. On June 19, 2001, Robbins gave 
Tsui an unsatisfactory evaluation because she was unable to keep the session focused 
on the stated goals. Tsui filed a grievance challenging the evaluation. 
The "Annual Professional Performance Review and Report on Probationary 
SeWiclToTGuidaTic^CouTTs^loTTis^ 
an unsatisfactory evaluation in five performance areas and an overall performance 
evaluation of unsatisfactory. The report was signed by Hershkowitz and Young. The 
superintendent recommended discontinuance of Tsui's probationary service, effective 
August 1,2001. 
Step 2 hearings were held before Miller on two of Tsui's grievances. Miller 
sustained Tsui's grievance on the letter of reprimand but denied her grievance on the 
second unsatisfactory evaluation. 
DISCUSSION 
Tsui contends that the ALJ did not consider several of her exhibits in drafting the 
ALJ's decision. Also, Tsui contends that the ALJ overlooked relevant testimony. 
The ALJ, in case U-22988, granted the District's timeliness defense, that affected 
events occurring prior to July 30, 2001. Since the charge was filed on November 30, 
2001, all events occurring prior to July 30, 2001, would be untimely. As the ALJ noted, 
the only timely event in that case was Tsui's employment termination effective August 1, 
2001. 
In case U-22908, the charge was filed on October 19, 2001. The charge focused 
on the letter of reprimand dated June 18, 2001, and the June 19, 2001 unsatisfactory 
evaluation. 
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The elements necessary to establish a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act: 
[A] charging party must prove [by a preponderance of the 
evidence] that he had been engaged in protected activities, and 
that the respondent had knowledge of and acted because of 
those activities. If the charging party proves a prima facie case 
of improper motivation, the burden of going forward shifts to the 
respondent to establish that its actions were motivated by 
le^itim^t^business^feasons.3 
Tsui, in her exceptions, urges us to reverse the ALJ's decision. The evidence 
Tsui asks us to consider is irrelevant.4 The record is clear that she was engaged in a 
protected activity in October 2000 when she sought the aid of her union to intercede 
and return her to her position. She also engaged in protected activity when she filed 
grievances objecting to the unsatisfactory evaluations and the letter of reprimand. The 
District was well aware of this activity because of its necessary participation in restoring 
Tsui to her position as well as its participation in the grievance process. 
We agree with the ALJ that the only issue for Tsui to establish was whether the 
complained of action would not have occurred but for her participation in protected 
activity. On this record, we concur with the ALJ's conclusion that there was insufficient 
evidence that the District was improperly motivated in taking action regarding Tsui. 
Tsui introduced no evidence to establish that the unsatisfactory evaluations she 
received were improperly motivated or were done in retaliation for those protected 
activities. On the contrary, and despite Tsui's unsatisfactory evaluation, the District 
restored her to her position with periodic evaluations of her performance, thus allowing 
3
 State of New York (SUNY Oswego), 34 PERB 1J3017 (2001). 
4
 The evidence Tsui submitted consisted of information that she considered important to 
her performance evaluation. 
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Tsui to correct her weaknesses. She failed to improve in the estimation of the District. 
Thus, Tsui failed to demonstrate any nexus between her protected activity and her 
subsequent unsatisfactory evaluations.5 
Notwithstanding Tsui's unsatisfactory evaluations, her employment as a 
probationary employee was terminable at will and without specific reason and, absent 
b^TaitlVthe^eteTmiMtion^Tnusrbe uph^ld:6""BadTaith"11T^the'pfobationary contexfis" 
only that action based on a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of 
statutory or decisional law.7 As before PERB, "bad faith" is that action which violates 
the Act or, stated otherwise, is that taken in retaliation for protected activity.8 Hence, a 
charging party challenging the termination of a probationary employee must show that 
the employer's motivation was improper and unlawful.9 
Moreover, our area of expertise is limited to interpretation of the Act,10 therefore, 
we do not pass judgment on the content of evaluations made of Tsui's counseling ability 
except to the extent that our review is necessary to a determination whether they were 
5
 Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 35 PERB 1J3002 (2002); 
Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 34 PERB 1J3036 (2001). 
6
 Talamo v. Murphy, 38 NY2d 637 (1976); Ostoyich v. State of New York, 99 AD2d 839 
(2nd Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 62 NY2d 605 (1984); Blum v. Quinones, 
139 AD2d 509 (2nd Dep't), appeal dismissed, 72 NY2d 908 (1988). 
7
 Soto v. Koehler, 171 AD2d 567 (1st Dep't) motion for leave to appeal denied, 78 NY2d 
855(1991). 
8
 Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 26 PERB 1J4555, affd, 26 
PERB H3082(1993). 
9
 County of Wyoming, 34 PERB H3042 (2001). 
10
 County of Nassau (Nassau Community Coll.) v. PERB, 151 AD2d 168, 22 PERB 
U7034 (2nd Dep't 1989), affd on other grounds, 76 NY2d 579, 23 PERB 1J7019 (1990). 
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improperly motivated or that they are evidence of a legitimate business purpose for the 
action taken. Having found no evidence of improper motivation, we affirm the decision 
of the ALJ and dismiss the exceptions. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
AlrJany; NewrYork" 
chael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
in T. Mitchell, Member 
n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUPERIOR OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE 
POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTY OF 
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and - CASE NO. U-23900 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
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CERTILMAN BALIN ADLER & HYMAN, LLP (WAYNE J. SCHAEFER, 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
LORNA B. GOODMAN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (DENNIS J. SAFFRON, of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
decision that found that the County of Nassau (County) had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally discontinued the 
practice of assigning a County vehicle to superior officers represented by the Superior 
Officers Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc. (SOA). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision on the ground that SOA failed to prove a 
valid charge. SOA filed a response in support of the ALJ's decision. 
) Based upon the record before us, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
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FACTS 
Within the Police Department of the County of Nassau, SOA represents a unit of 
superior officers that includes sergeants, lieutenants, captains, deputy inspectors, 
inspectors, deputy chief, and assistant chief. 
The charge, as amended, involves four sergeants who had been assigned to the 
'"Dep^meTrt"'s7Applic~a^ 
supervise the police officers assigned to that unit. 
Sergeants John Ruane, Edward Perkins and Margaret S. Funk each testified about 
the circumstances under which they were assigned a County vehicle upon their 
assignment to the AlU unit. In addition to their work schedules, they were allowed to use 
the vehicles to commute between home and work. As a result of their assignment to AlU, 
they could use the vehicles on a twenty-four hour basis except for personal use. On July 
19, 2002, Ruane, Perkins and Funk were temporarily transferred out of AlU to other 
assignments. During the period of the temporary transfer, Ruane, Perkins and Funk lost 
the use of a County vehicle on a twenty-four hour basis. 
Perkins testified that, upon his reassignment to AlU in September 2002, the use of 
a County vehicle was restored but was thereafter revoked in November 2002. On cross-
examination, Perkins testified that he was not aware of anyone above the rank of 
commanding officer that authorized the use of a take-home car. Ruane testified that, 
upon his return to AlU in October 2002, Lt. Allen McGovern, commanding officer of AlU, 
advised him that he was unable to reassign to him a County vehicle for twenty-four hour 
use. Any vehicle assigned was only to be used during working hours and could not be 
driven home. Funk testified that, upon her return to AlU in November 2002, she was not 
reassigned a County vehicle for twenty-four hour use. Funk stated that the order revoking 
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the use of the County vehicles on a twenty-four hour basis came from Inspector Lorraine 
Hannon, commanding officer of the Personnel and Accounting Bureau. 
Sergeant Michael Cafarella testified that, as a police officer, he was assigned to 
AlU in 1989 at which time Chief David Murray, former commanding officer of the 
Personnel and Accounting Bureau, told him that there would be a vehicle assigned with 
i\Ye commalidT^ccording~t^CafalBlla^~ilT'1989^ll^f7\rU's^sergeants were assigned^ 
County vehicle for twenty-four hour use. 
Cafarella was promoted to sergeant in 1992 and, as a supervisor in AlU, he was 
assigned a County vehicle for twenty-four hour use. In September 2002, McGovern 
advised Cafarella that the department intended to remove the County vehicles from the 
AlU sergeants who had been reassigned. Cafarella testified that Hannon told him that no 
one in the AlU would be assigned a County vehicle except the commanding officer and 
the deputy commanding officer. Cafarella became the deputy commanding officer on 
December 6, 2002. 
By November 2002, the use of a County vehicle on a twenty-four hour basis had 
been removed from all AlU sergeants. SOA filed the instant charge, as amended, on 
December 4, 2002. The County, in its answer, raised the affirmative defense that SOA 
waived its right to negotiate over the County's decision to implement the at-issue 
change.1 The parties' collective bargaining agreement makes no mention of the use of 
County vehicles. 
A hearing was held on May 20, 2003, and, at the conclusion of SOA's direct case, 
the County moved to dismiss on the ground that SOA failed to prove a prima facie case. 
1
 The ALJ dismissed the County's waiver defense for failure to plead or prove any facts 
upon which a waiver could be found. 
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The motion was denied and the County was directed to present its case. The County 
elected not to proceed and moved to dismiss the charge upon the record before the ALJ. 




vehicles to Perkins, Funk and Ruane unilaterally changed a mandatory term and 
condition of employment and violated the County's duty to negotiate in good faith. The 
County's exception argues that SOA failed to prove the essential elements of a past 
practice based on our decision in Sherburne-Earlville Central School District,2 (hereafter, 
Sherburne-Earlville) and, therefore, the charge should be dismissed. 
We concur with the ALJ's conclusion that, in general, an employee's use of his/her 
employer's vehicle for transportation to and from work is an economic benefit for the 
employee and may not be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer.3 However, we 
disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that SOA has proven that a past practice was 
established. 
In order for us.to find a violation on this record, we must find that the alleged past 
practice was unequivocal and existed for a significant period of time such that the 
employees in the unit could reasonably expect the practice to continue without change.4 
2
 36 PERB 1(3011 (2003). 
3
 County of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3036 (2002); County of Monroe, 33 PERB j[3044 (2000); 
County of Nassau, 26 PERB 1J3040 (1993), confirmed, 215 AD2d 381, 28 PERB 1J7011 
(2dDep't1995). 
4
 County of Nassau, 35 PERB P036 (2002); City of Peekskill, 35 PERB 1J3016 (2002). 
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That the benefit inured only to sergeants in the AlU does not preclude the finding of a 
past practice because we have determined that a practice may be title specific and need 
not affect the unit as a whole if a rational basis is demonstrated for so limiting the 
practice.5 
SOA has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the reliable 
~evide7rc^ ~th~at~a~p7a~s^  
revoking the twenty-four hour use of County vehicles by the AlU sergeants is a change in 
that practice. Consequently, if SOA fails to prove an essential element of the charge, the 
charge will be dismissed.7 
Here, the three sergeants testified that, upon their assignments to the AlU unit, 
each received a County-owned vehicle with twenty-four hour use. The only implicit 
caveat was to avoid personal use of the vehicle.8 While this testimony establishes which 
employees had the use of the County's vehicles and the limitations on their use of the 
vehicles, it is insufficient to establish the violation alleged. It cannot be concluded on this 
record that the alleged practice was unequivocal. Inherent in the finding that a practice is 
unequivocal is the concept of the employer's knowledge of the practice either through 
direct negotiations or indirectly through condoning, ratifying or acquiescing in the 
5
 County of Nassau, supra, note 4. 
6
 State of New York, 33 PERB 1)3024 (2000), confirmed sub nom. Benson v. Cuevas, 288 
AD2d 542, 34 PERB H7034 (3d Dep't2001). 
7
 Id. 
Transcript, p. 45. 
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practice.9 There is no evidence on this record of direct negotiations or that the County 
authorized, ratified, condoned or acquiesced in the alleged practice.10 
We reject the ALJ's attempt to either factually or legally distinguish the instant case 
from Sherburne-Earlville. The principle underlying Sherburne-Earlville, as with the instant 
case, was whether the employer's agent had the authority to bind the employer to the 
~aire~ge~d-practice7~We 
employee's authority merely from his/her status as a supervisor. Instead, we should 
require a more definite delegation of authority to the employee. In support of this 
principle, we cited to City of Schenectady.11 The ALJ has misinterpreted our reliance on 
the City of Schenectady in support of her decision that "the totality of the circumstances" 
will suffice to establish the agent's authority. It is within "the totality of the circumstances" 
that an inquiry into the employee's authority is made. As we said in Schenectady, "[t]he 
ultimate focus must always be on the agency relationship, not supervisory status itself."12 
This is a fact question which the charging party must prove.13 
We have, on occasion, found decisions of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) and other jurisdictions to be instructive. However, on the issue presented in this 
9Supra, note 2. 
10
 Sherburne-Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist, supra; State of New York (Dep't of Correctional 
Services), 36 PERB 1J3040 (2003); State of New York (Wende Correctional Facility), 33 
PERB U3022 (2000). 
11
 26 PERB 1J3038 (1993). 
12
 Id. at 3064. 
13
 2A NY Jur. 2d, Agency and Independent Contractors, §30; see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Agency, §342; accord Lancaster County, 1993 PPER (LRP) Lexis 159 (1993); Inglewood 
Unified Sch. Dist, 1991 PERC (LRP) Lexis 239. 
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case, we reject the NLRB decisions regarding acts of supervisors that are imputed to their 
employer because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) statutorily defines a 
supervisor as the employer's representative.14 There is no similar provision in our Act. 
We are, therefore, in accord with the rationale of the California Court of Appeals, in 
Inglewood, which is consistent with our prior holding in Sherburne-Earlville.15 
As~in~S/7er/3t/rne-Ear/w//e7the~recordin this case^is~devoid~of^any"factsTegarding 
knowledge of the alleged practice by SOA's bargaining representative or the County. The 
testimony of all three sergeants points to the lieutenant in the AIU unit as the person 
assigning County vehicles to them. There is no testimonial or documentary evidence that 
establishes his authority to make such an assignment. We may not assume that the 
lieutenant in the AIU unit had the implied authority to represent the collective bargaining 
interests of the County. Although Cafarella makes reference to a conversation with Chief 
Murray in 1989, Cafarella makes only an oblique reference to the practice in question. 
We are left to speculate what he meant by his comment, "there would be a vehicle 
assigned with command." Consequently, the County's authorization of, ratification of, 
acquiescence in or condonation of this alleged practice has not been established. 
Perkins testified on cross-examination that he was not aware of anyone above a 
command position that authorized the use of a County vehicle. Inspector Hannon was in 
a command position, however, the sergeants, lieutenants and inspector involved in this 
case are all represented by SOA. We cannot determine on this record the command 
structure of the Nassau County Police Department in order to identify those individuals 
who might possess express or implied policy-making authority sufficient to bind the 
14
 5 USCS §7103 (10). 
15
 Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist, supra, note 13. 
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County on this issue. Consequently, SOA has failed to prove mutuality in the creation of 
the practice.16 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of the employer's indirect knowledge of the 
alleged practice. We may not speculate on whether the County authorized, condoned, 
ratified or acquiesced in the alleged practice.17 
WeTejectthe~AbdVconclusion~thatihe^Countyin_this~matterwas~hotfree~to 
unilaterally remove the assigned vehicles because it would change the status quo. The 
ALJ's decision is based on the principle that the status quo may not be changed unless 
and until the parties have fulfilled their collective bargaining responsibilities under the Act. 
This principle is correct, however, it was misapplied in this case. 
As we have found in this case, the evidence does not establish that the County 
ever agreed to the alleged practice. The Act defines an agreement as the result of the 
exchange of mutual promises between the chief executive officer of a public employer [or 
16
 Supra, note 8. See also Southfield Educ. Ass'n., v. Southfield Pub. Schools, 2004 
MPER (LRP) Lexis 4. 
17
 The following represents the Nassau County cases that have come before PERB 
ostensibly on the issue of past practice and whether the County violated the Act when it 
unilaterally removed an assigned vehicle. It must be noted that in those cases where a 
violation was found, it was based upon the conduct of a County policymaker. See County 
of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J4583 (2002) [finding no violation of conditional assignment of 
County-owned vehicles in Sheriff's Department]; County of Nassau, 19 PERB fl4580 
(1986) [finding no violation of conditional assignment of County-owned vehicle in Water 
Department]. But cf. County of Nassau, 35 PERB 1J3036 (2002) [finding a violation 
because the Sheriff unilaterally issued directive rescinding 24/7 use of County-owned 
vehicles]; County of Nassau, 26 PERB1J3040 (1993), aff'd, 215 AD2d 381 (2d Dep't 
1995) 28 PERB ^7011 (1995) [finding a violation because the Commissioner of DPW 
issued directive rescinding 24/7 use of County-owned vehicles]; County of Nassau, 13 
PERB H3095 (1980), aff'g 13 PERB 1J4570 (1980), confirmed, 14 PERB 1J7017 (Sup. Ct. 
Nassau Co. 1981), aff'd, 87 AD2d 1006, 15 PERB U7012 (2d Dep't 1982), motion for 
leave to appeal denied, 57 NY2d 601, 15 PERB 1J7015 (1982) [finding a violation in DPW 
upon stipulated facts]. 
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its designee] and the employee organization which becomes a binding contract.18 
Furthermore, the Act describes the process of collective negotiations:19 
. . . to negotiate collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the public employer and a recognized or certified 
employee organization to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement.. . . 
9 
noncontractual terms and conditions is not based upon "mutual" agreement is the 
antithesis of the policy underlying the Act. Here there has been no showing that the 
practice was either mutually created or mutually accepted. 
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby grant the County's exceptions and reverse 
the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
T. Mitchell, Member 
18
 Act, §201.12. 
19
 Act, §204.3. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER POLICE LOCUST CLUB, INC., 
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- and - CASE NOS. U-23938 & U-24081 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the City of Rochester (City) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City violated §209-a.1(a) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied police officers 
represented by the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. (Locust Club), who were under 
criminal investigation, access to a Locust Club representative. The charge filed by the 
Locust Club in U-23938 alleges that the City denied a request by Officer McHale for 
union representation during a criminal investigation conducted by the City following an 
incident on September 25, 2002, when Officer McHale discharged his weapon. The 
charge filed by the Locust Club in Case U-24081 alleges that the City denied a request 
by Officer Snow on February 14, 2003, for representation by a Locust Club 
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representative while he was under investigation for discharging his weapon during his 
response to a robbery in progress at a home. The charges were consolidated for 
hearing and decision. 
The ALJ found that the City violated the Act in both cases when it denied 
requests by Officers McHale and Snow for union representation and when it denied the 
tocustClubaccessrto'theofficersduring thexriminal investigations~conducted~by-the— 
City into the underlying incidents. The ALJ relied upon the Board's recent decision in 
New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA)? in which we found that, when union 
representation has been requested, an employee covered by the Act has a statutory 
right to refuse to submit without union representation to an investigatory interview which 
he or she reasonably fears may result in discipline. In NYCTA, we found the Act made 
applicable to public employees the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in National 
Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten (Weingarten),2 holding that 
... it is a serious violation of the employee's individual right to 
engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his 
statutory representative if the employer denies the 
employee's request and compels the employee to appear 
unassisted at an interview that may put his job security in 
jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee's right to act 
collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, 
unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted 
protection, rather than individual self-protection, against 
possible adverse employer action.3 
1
 35 PERB U3029 (2002), confirmed, 196 Misc2d 532, 36 PERB 1J7009 (Sup. Ct. Kings 
County 2003) (appeal pending). 
2
 420 US 251 (1975). 
3
 Id. at 257. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that there is no right to 
union representation at a criminal investigation and that public policy considerations 
preclude union representation at criminal investigations. The Locust Club supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
BaseduponnDur review of therecordandourconsiderationof theparties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are few and are not in dispute, the parties having stipulated to a record 
upon which the ALJ based her decision.4 
The City defines a situation in which a police officer discharges a weapon as a 
"critical incident". When such an incident occurs, the City's Police Department 
(Department) conducts two separate but parallel investigations. One is conducted by 
the Professional Standards Section (internal affairs) and is used to decide whether 
departmental charges should be filed and discipline imposed. Article 20 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement covers this procedure and provides for the right of 
union representation during any investigatory interviews upon the request of the officer. 
The Department also conducts a criminal investigation of critical incidents. Such 
investigations are conducted by the Critical Incident Investigation Team . As part of 
these investigations, it is the Department's practice to separate suspects and witnesses 
from each other and any third parties not actively involved in conducting the 
investigations. 
4
 37 PERB H4507 (2004). 
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r~\ In both the critical incidents in-issue here, the police officers requested, and were 
denied by the Department, representation by the Locust Club prior to and during the 
investigatory interviews conducted by the Critical Incident Investigation Team. In Officer 
McHale's case, the Locust Club's attorney presented an Order to Show Cause enjoining 
the Department from excluding union representatives or attorneys from interviews of 
'~ffn1twe7nb~ets~p~e-nT^ ~ 
asserted his right to remain silent when asked for a statement during the criminal 
investigation. Officer Snow was denied union representation during his criminal 
investigation interview. He asserted his constitutional right to counsel and, after 
consultation with the Locust Club's attorney, he invoked his constitutional right to remain 
silent. Both officers were afforded representation by the Locust Club during their 
interviews by the Professional Standards Section. 
DISCUSSION 
It was only in 2002 when the issue of the right of union representation during an 
investigatory interview was first presented squarely to the Board. In our decision in 
NYCTA, we determined that the rights set forth in Weingarten were applicable to public 
employees covered by the Act. As we stated in NYCTA:" We here find that an 
employee has the right to union representation during an investigatory interview which 
may reasonably lead to discipline."5 The question presented in the instant case is 
whether the right to union representation extends to a criminal investigation interview of 
J 5 Supra, note 1 at 3082. 
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a police officer related to actions taken by the police officer in the performance of his or 
her duties as a police officer.6 We find that it does. 
The City relies on numerous decisions of the Board which found that demands 
relating to the conduct of criminal investigations by an employer are nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiations in support of its assertion that the right to union representation 
doesnot extend toxriminaHnvestigations.M/Ve ^ 
First, as correctly noted by the ALJ.-in none of those decisions was union representation 
a deciding factor in the determination on the negotiability of the demand. Second, as we 
noted in City of Buffalo:8 
Employees have the protected statutory right to have union 
representation with respect to any issue affecting their 
employment relationship, whether or not that issue 
embraces a mandatory subject of negotiation. That request 
for and receipt of union representation constitutes 
participation in a union, a right specifically protected by §202 
of the Act. 
That the procedures for the conduct of criminal investigations may involve 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiations does not compel a conclusion that a police 
6
 We do not reach the issue of a police officer's rights to union representation during a 
criminal investigation that is not related to actions taken by the police officer as part of 
his or her employment. 
7
 City of White Plains, 33 PERB1J3051 (2000); Schenectady PBA, 21 PERB 1J3022 
(1988); PBA of Newburg/?, New York, Inc., 18 PERB 1J3065 (1985) petition dismissed, 
19 PERB 1F7005 (sup. Ct. Albany County 1986); Police Ass'n of the City ofMt.Vernon, 
Inc., 13 PERB 1J3071 (1980); PBA of the City of White Plains, Inc., 12 PERB fl3046 
(1979); City of Rochester, 12 PERB fl3010 (1979); Town of Haverstraw, 11 PERB 
1J3109 (1978) (later history omitted); PBA of Hempstead, N.Y., Inc., 11 PERB 
H3072 (1978); Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, Inc., 10 PERB fl3042 (1977); Troy 
Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 PERB P015 (1977); Scarsdale 
PBA, Inc., 8 PERB j[3075 (1975). 
30 PERB H3021, at 3048 (1997). 
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officer has no right to union representation during the conduct of an investigatory 
interview that is part of a criminal investigation into actions taken by the police officer as 
a police officer. 
While we have recognized that it is an inherent governmental function of a police 
department to investigate possible criminal activity within its jurisdiction,9 the 
ttepiartmeTit'sTightioncmd 
of constitutional and statutory restrictions; for example, the rights of suspects articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.™ The right to union representation at a 
criminal investigation interview into the performance by a police officer of his or her 
duties is no more intrusive than the right to counsel afforded to every citizen pursuant to 
Miranda. 
The City's public policy argument that criminal investigations not be impeded by 
the involvement of a union representative is not without merit. However, the argument 
ignores the strictures placed by the Supreme Court in Weingarten upon the actions of a 
union representative before and during the investigatory interview. In Weingarten, the 
Court held that: 
... exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate 
employer prerogatives. The employer has no obligation to 
justify his refusal to allow union representation, and despite 
refusal, the employer is free to carry on his inquiry without 
interviewing the.employee, and thus leave to the employee 
the choice between having an interview unaccompanied by 
his representative, or having no interview and forgoing any 
benefits that might be derived from one.11 
9
 See Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, 10 PERB1J3042 (1977). 
10
 384 US 436 (1966). 
11
 Supra, note 2 at 259. 
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The representative is there to assist the employee but not to negotiate with the 
employer or interfere in any way with the progress of the investigation. The employer is 
free to insist on hearing the employee's own account of the matter under investigation.12 
The integrity of the investigation is not compromised by the presence of a union 
representative any more than it is compromised by the presence of the police officer's 
attorney, which the City concedes is required by Miranda. 
The holding in Weingarten is not limited to only a disciplinary interview. The 
language of the Court makes its holding applicable to "an investigatory interview which 
the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action."13 We find that a 
police officer who is subject to a criminal investigation interview into the performance of 
his or her duties which may constitute criminal behavior has a reasonable belief that 
discipline will follow. The City notes in its pleadings that police officers are only 
performing their police officer functions when they answer questions during a Critical 
Incident Investigation interview.14 The failure to so perform police officer functions could 
lead a police officer to reasonably conclude that discipline would follow. 
As Officers McHale and Snow both requested union representation before their 
Critical Incident Investigation interviews and such requests were denied by the City and 
the City denied representatives of the Locust Club access to the police officers after the 
officers requested representation, we find that the City violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
12
 See, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Dep't of Corrections, Retreat SCI), 34 PPER 
140 (2003), holding that the permissible extent of participation of a Weingarten 
representative is somewhere between mandatory silence and adversarial confrontation. 
13
 Supra, note 2 at 252. 
14
 Answer (U-23938), p. 6. 
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The City's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is, therefore, affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to permit a Locust Club representative to be 
present when a member requests representation at criminal investigations 
conducted by the Critical Incident Team relating to possible criminal conduct 
of a member arising from theperformanceof his or her job: 
2. Cease and desist from refusing to permit a Locust Club representative to 
confer with members when a member requests representation prior to a 
criminal investigation conducted by the Critical Incident Team relating to 
possible criminal conduct of a member arising from the performance of his or 
her job. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with members of the Locust Club. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Mtehael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
N E W Y Q R K S T A T E 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Rochester, in the unit represented by the Rochester 
Police Locust Club, Inc., that the City of Rochester will: 
1. Not refuse to permit a Locust Club representative to be present when a member 
requests representation at criminal investigations conducted by the Critical 
Incident Team relating to possible criminal conduct of a member arising from the 
) performance of his or her job. 
2. Not refuse to permit a Locust Club representative to confer with members when a 
member requests representation prior to a criminal investigation conducted by the 
Critical Incident Team relating to possible criminal conduct of a member arising 
from the performance of his or her job. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF ROCHESTER 
J 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION DIVISION 726, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23339 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS, LLP (BETH M. MARGOLIS of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT K. DRINAN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Authority 
violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it disciplined an employee represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union Division 726, 
AFL-CIO (ATU) for a uniform violation and when it denied his request for union release 
time. The ATU has filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of certain of the other 
alleged violations set forth in the ATU's improper practice charge. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Authority excepts to the ALJ's finding of a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of 
the Act, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding that the filing of hundreds of meritless 
grievances is a protected activity and by finding anti-union animus in its treatment of 
Miguel Mendez, an ATU grievance representative. 
The~Ai^bxross=exceptsioihe~AUVdecision dismissingasuntimelyihe 
allegation in its charge that the Authority violated §209-a.1(d) by unilaterally changing its 
past practice of granting ATU officials leave to attend monthly ATU meetings. The ATU 
also cross-excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of the allegations in the charge that Frank 
O'Connor was disciplined for exercising his rights under the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
) 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in painstaking detail in the ALJ's voluminous 65-page 
decision1 and will be summarized here only as necessary to address the exceptions and 
cross-exceptions. 
The Authority operates two bus depots on Staten Island: Castleton and Yukon. 
One of the duties of a Maintainer Helper Group B (MHB) is to change bus tires. Frank 
O'Connor has been an MHB for 18 years and, in 2001, was appointed by Larry Hanley, 
then president of ATU, as a "title representative" of MHBs at Castleton. Miguel Mendez 
has been employed by the Authority as a bus operator since 1991. At the times relevant 
to the charge, he was assigned to the Yukon depot. Mendez was also the recording 
1
 37 PERB H4506 (2004). 
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secretary for ATU and was handling disciplinary and grievance hearings and conducting 
safety walks. 
Miguel Mendez 
Mendez filed 36 grievances with General Superintendent Palmer Reale on behalf 
of the ATU on April 3, 2002, at approximately 10:30 a.m. The grievances alleged 
--violationsofthe-parties'collet 
primarily with buses on which there was a broken speedometer. At 3:00 p.m. on the 
same day, Mendez was served with a notice of discipline (NOD), alleging that he had 
driven an Authority bus on April 2, 2002, while not in uniform, and seeking a five-day 
suspension.2 Mendez had driven the bus with other drivers as passengers to the depot 
to pick up their buses. He had been involved in a disciplinary hearing right before his 
shift started and testified that he was running late and went down to his bus without 
returning to his office to retrieve his tie. The Authority's General Superintendent, Robert 
Balsamo, and Assistant General Manager (AGM) Richard DeVito saw him without his 
tie and DeVito remarked to him at the time that he was "easy to get". 
When Mendez informed Hanley that he had been served with the NOD, Hanley 
told him that Balsamo had said that "for every grievance Mendez filed they [the 
Authority] were going to write somebody up" and that Mendez would be written up 
2
 At the time of the hearing in this matter, Mendez was proceeding to arbitration on the 
NOD. Mendez testified that the typical penalty for a uniform infraction is reinstruction by 
a supervisor. 
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for not wearing his tie on April 2.3 Balsamo never disputed making that statement.4 
Mendez stated that a supervisor, Rourke, told him that he had been instructed to stand 
outside a depot and write violations for any drivers not in proper uniform. Mendez also 
testified that an AGM named Bryant asked him, in reference to the Authority's actions in 
writing up drivers for uniform infractions, if he wanted "to call a truce." That these 
"statementswere^made isnotdisputedbythe'Authorityr5 
On April 29, 2002, Mendez submitted a request for union release time to attend 
an ATU membership meeting on May 3, 2002. His request was denied on May 2. The 
meeting was a regularly scheduled meeting and Mendez testified that the Authority had 
never before denied such a request from him. The notation on the bottom of the denial 
of leave request document stated that the release time was denied because the relief 
bus driver list was exhausted. Despite the denial of leave, Mendez attended the meeting 
on May 3, 2002. He was charged with being AWOL and served with an NOD on May 
17,2002. 
Union release time 
The ATU filed an amended charge, on September 12, 2002, alleging that the 
Authority's failure to grant Mendez (and others) release time on May 2, 2002, to allow 
him to attend the May 3, 2002 membership meeting was a unilateral change in the 
parties' past practice of granting ATU officials release time to attend monthly union 
3
 Transcript (November 7, 2002), p.93. 
4
 The Authority argues in its brief in support of its exceptions that "perhaps due to the 
length of the hearing, Balsamo was not, apparently, asked to respond to Hanley's 
characterization of the statement." Brief, p. 9, note 3. 
5
 Neither Rourke nor Bryant testified at the hearing. 
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meetings, in violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Prior to that amendment, the ATU had 
alleged in its original charge only that the refusal to grant Mendez and other ATU 
officials release time in May 2002 had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. The ALJ 
found that the amended charge, alleging a violation of §209-a.1(d), having been filed 
more than four months after the alleged improper conduct,6 was untimely and dismissed 
that~aspect"of thexharger7 
Frank O'Connor 
The Authority served O'Connor with four disciplinary notices on June 21, 2002, 
the Friday immediately preceding Monday, June 24, 2002, the date of the first 
conference scheduled in this matter. The NODs were for changing only seven tires per 
day, instead of the requisite eight, on June 5, 10, 12, and 20, 2002. O'Connor had been 
under close supervision at Balsamo's instruction in March and April 2002 after Balsamo 
received reports in January 2002 about cracked rims on tires being changed at the 
Castleton depot. O'Connor was one of two MHBs who was under scrutiny. O'Connor, 
during and, perhaps, as a result of the scrutiny, engaged in a work slowdown, during 
which he and his partner reduced the number of tires changed from eight per day to 
five, six or seven per day. During that time, relations between the ATU and the Authority 
were strained and relations between O'Connor and his supervisors were contentious. 
Assistant General Superintendent Carmine Mastrangelo counseled O'Connor in March 
6
 PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1 (a). 
7
 The ALJ also determined that the ATU attempted to argue in its brief that the Authority 
had imposed a 48 to 72 hour advance notice requirement for union release time 
requests as a unilateral change in a term and condition of employment. The ALJ 
rejected the claim as not being part of the charge before her and as having no support 
in the record, as the stated reason for the denial of Mendez's request for leave to attend 
the May 3, 2002 membership meeting was staffing needs, not lack of advance notice. 
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and April 2002 about his productivity. Upon the request of the ATU, the March and April 
counseling memorandums were withdrawn. O'Connor failed to improve his performance 
and the NODs were issued in June 2002, citing him for four days in which his 
productivity dropped to seven tire changes per day. When O'Connor questioned AGM 




The ALJ made several credibility resolutions in determining the facts upon which 
the decision is based. Her credibility resolutions are based upon the demeanor of the 
witnesses at the hearing and the manner in which they offered their testimony. There is 
nothing in the record that would warrant disturbing those credibility resolutions9 and we 
hereby adopt them and the ALJ's findings of fact. 
We affirm the ALJ's determination that the alleged violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the 
Act was untimely filed. The denial of the leave request occurred on May 2, 2002; the 
amended charge alleging that the Authority's action was a change in the parties' past 
practice was not filed until September 12, 2002. 
We have allowed amendments to include a newly alleged violation of a different 
subsection of the Act to an improper practice charge where a newly alleged violation is 
DeVito was not called to testify at the hearing. 
9See City of Rochester, 23 PERB P049 (1990), cont'd, 182 AD2d 1081, 25 PERB 
1J7004 (4th Dep't 1992). See also Fashion Institute of Technology v. Helsby, 44 AD2d 
550, 7 PERB H7005 (1st Dep't 1974). 
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part of the facts and transactions set forth in the original charge.10 Where, however, the 
amendment seeks to add a different cause of action, albeit based upon similar facts, an 
amendment which is not timely filed is not permitted.11 Here, the facts set forth in the 
May 24, 2002, amendment allege that Mendez was denied union release time in 
retaliation for the exercise of protected rights. An amendment filed on September 12, 
20027~allegestbatthe-denial MendezVrequestforunion-release-timeviolates-§209-
a.1(d) of the Act because it is a unilateral change in a past practice. New facts to 
support the alleged (d) violation were pled and were in addition to facts pled earlier in 
support of the alleged (a) and (c) violations. We have previously noted several times 
that amendments adding new causes of action are properly denied.12 
Miguel Mendez 
The ALJ found that the Authority violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act when it 
disciplined Mendez for not wearing his tie on April 2, 2002, and when it denied his 
request for union release time on May 3, 2002.13 The ALJ found that Mendez had been 
involved in protected activity while representing employees in labor-management issues 
and in filing and processing grievances, and particularly, when he filed 36 grievances on 
^Village ofDepew, 24 PERB fl4560 (1991), affirmed on other grounds, 25 PERB 
113009(1992). 
nTown of Brookhaven, 25 PERB 1J3077(1992). 
12
 See, e.g., State of New York (Dep't of Transportation), 23 PERB 1J3005 (1990), 
confd, 174 AD2d 905, 24 PERB U7014 (3d Dep't 1991); Service Employees Int'l Union, 
Local 222, 16 PERB 1J3063 (1983); Public Employees Fed'n, 14 PERB 1J3036 (1981); 
Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free Sch. Dist, 9 PERB 1J3012 (1976). 
13
 No exceptions were filed regarding the ALJ's determination that the Authority violated 
the Act when it disciplined four other drivers on April 3 and/or April 4, 2002 for uniform 
violations. We, therefore, do not reach her decision on those aspects of the charge. 
Board - U-23339 - 8 
April 3, 2002. She also found that his supervisors and those in management had 
knowledge of his activities. The ALJ concluded that but for the filing of the grievances 
on April 3, 2002, Mendez would not have been disciplined later that day for the uniform 
infraction of the previous day. The Authority argues that the filing of 36 frivolous 
grievances is not protected activity and that the penalty was warranted based upon 
Mentlez's~previous~emproymentTecordT 
It is well-settled that the proof required in §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) cases is that the 
charging party establish that the employee was engaged in a protected activity, the 
employer knew of the protected activity and that the complained of employer's action 
would not have been taken but for the exercise of protected rights by the charging 
party.14 We find, as did the ALJ, that Mendez was engaged in protected activity when he 
filed the grievances on April 3, 2002. The number of grievances and their subject matter 
do not here destroy the protection afforded by the Act to this fundamental organizational 
activity, especially when there is no record evidence which compels a finding that the 
number of grievances was onerous or the claims were undeniably frivolous. We have 
held in the past that the Act protects an employee who engages in conduct on behalf of 
the employee organization, such as the filing of grievances.15 It is only when such 
conduct becomes inappropriate, that an employer may impose justifiable discipline.16 
There is no dispute that the Authority was aware of the grievances filed by Mendez on 
14
 See State of New York, 33 PERB1J3046 (2000), confd sub nom. Benson v. Cuevas, 
293 AD2d 927, 35 PERB fl7008 (2002), Iv denied, 98 NY2d 611, 35 PERb 1J7017 
(2002). 
15
 County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 1J3042 (2001). 
16
 City of Utica, 33 PERB P039 (2000); State of New York (Dep't of Social Servs.), 26 
PERB H3035(1993). 
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April 3. That the NOD issued to Mendez was improperly motivated is amply 
demonstrated by the timing of the NOD, coupled with the severity of the penalty sought 
and Balsamo's statement to Hanley. While urged to do so by the Authority, there is 
nothing in the record to warrant disturbing the ALJ's finding that Balsamo's unrebutted 
statement was made or that an improper motive be assigned to it. 
We~need~notras didihe~AbJ7find-that-Balsamo's statementis aperseviolation— 
of the Act. The statement is sufficient evidence of the animus Balsamo felt toward 
Mendez for filing the grievances and the improper motivation behind the issuance of the 
NOD to Mendez. In Greenburgh #11 Union Free School District17 (hereafter, 
Greenburgh) we reevaluated the nature of a perse violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) and 
departed from our prior holdings, in particular an earlier Board decision in State of New 
York.18 In that case, we first articulated a standard of proof that an employer's conduct 
which was so inherently destructive of a §202 right was "irrebuttably presumed" to have 
been done for the purpose of depriving employees of such rights. We reasoned in 
Greenburgh that the Act requires deliberate conduct on the employer's part for the 
purpose of depriving public employees of such rights in order for a violation of §§209-
a.1(a) and (c) to be found. As we said in Greenburgh, the concept of an irrebuttable 
presumption is no longer tenable because such an assumption is conclusive and cannot 
be contradicted, modified or explained. We went on to hold that the better rule would be 
to hold that the facts make out a permissive presumption, which is favored in New York 
law, and which would shift the burden of going forward to the responding party to rebut 
the presumption by sufficient proof to the contrary. 
17
 33 PERB 113018(2000). 
18
 10 PERB H3108(1977). 
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Here, the filing of the grievances by Mendez, followed almost immediately by the 
issuance of a NOD against him, coupled with the unrebutted statement from Balsamo 
that for every grievance filed an employee would be written up and Mendez would be 
disciplined for not wearing a tie, and the statements of Rourke and Bryant to Mendez, 
created a presumption that Mendez would not have been disciplined but for his exercise 
of-a~protectedTightrThe~Authority has not-introduced-evidencesufficientto-rebutthe—-
presumption. 
Likewise, the Authority's denial of Mendez's request for union release time for the 
membership meeting on May 3, 2002, was improper. The timing of the denial, following 
shortly after the filing by Mendez of 36 grievances and his receipt of the NOD, coupled 
with Balsamo's expression of animus was sufficient to establish a prima facie case by 
the ATU. The Authority's mere notation on the denial of leave request that relief drivers 
were not available, without record evidence that relief drivers were unavailable, is 
insufficient to establish a legitimate business reason for the denial.19 
However, no remedy may be ordered even though the Authority's denial of union 
release time for Mendez violates §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. Mendez was absent 
from work without permission to attend the May 3 membership meeting. The discipline 
which followed cannot be rescinded because the Authority acted improperly initially, 
given Mendez's intervening misconduct. Mendez should have complied with the 
Authority's decision and sought redress through the appropriate channels.20 
Frank O'Connor 
wSee Village of Scotia v. PERB, 241 AD2d 29, 31 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1998). 
20
 See State University of New York (SUNY Oswego), 36 PERB 1J3015 (2003), petition 
for review pending. 
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ATU argues that the ALJ erred by finding that the Authority's issuance of four 
disciplinary charges to O'Connor did not violate the Act. It is undisputed that O'Connor 
did not change eight tires on the days for which he was disciplined. ATU argues that 
there were reasons that prevented O'Connor from changing eight tires per day and that 
O'Connor had not been changing eight tires a day during March and April. He was not 
djscjpljnecl-cltirjng-thatiime^hence-theissuance^ofthefour NODsjustbeforethePERB 
conference on the original improper practice charge must be found to have been for an 
improper purpose. 
The record shows that O'Connor was counseled in March and April for his sub-
standard productivity. O'Connor's productivity did not improve and he was served with 
the NODs in June 2002. The ALJ found that, although O'Connor may have been told 
that the timing of the filing of the NODs (just before the pre-hearing conference) was 
based on leverage, the Authority had legitimate business reasons for disciplining 
O'Connor for productivity deficits. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the ALJ's conclusion that O'Connor had decreased productivity during the months 
preceding the service of the disciplinary charges in June 2002. DeVito's statement to 
O'Connor about the timing of the service of the notices does not, as found by the ALJ, 
alter the fact that the Authority established that there were genuine business reasons 
which prompted O'Connor's discipline. 
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the exceptions filed by the Authority and the 
cross-exceptions filed by ATU and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
We find, therefore, that the Authority violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act 
regarding the April 3, 2002 discipline of Mendez for uniform violations and for the denial 
j 
of Mendez's request for union release on May 3, 2002. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the NYCTA forthwith: 
1. Rescind the notice of discipline issued to Miguel Mendez on April 3, 2002, 
for uniform violations and make him whole for lost wages or benefits, if any, suffered as 
a result of said discipline, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining and discriminating against 
~MigueTMencIezlntherexerciserofTights~protected by the~Actrbydisciplining-him forfiling-
grievances and/or for grievance activity; 
3. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining and discriminating against 
Miguel Mendez in the exercise of his rights protected by the Act, by denying him union 
release time to attend monthly membership meetings based on his having filed 
grievances; 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to 
communicate with employees represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union Division 
726, AFL-CIO. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman %M^t 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), in the unit represented by 
the Amalgamated Transit Union Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU) that the NYCTA will: 
1. Rescind the notice of discipline issued to Miguel Mendez on April 3, 2002, for uniform 
violations and make him whole for lost wages or benefits, if any, suffered as a result of 
said discipline, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
2. Not interfere with, restrain and discriminate against Miguel Mendez in the exercise of 
rights protected by the Act, by disciplining him for filing grievances and/or for grievance 
activity. 
3. Not interfere with, restrain and discriminate against Miguel Mendez in the exercise of 
his rights protected by the Act, by denying him union release time to attend monthly 
membership meetings based on his having filed grievances. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
New York City Transit Authority 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL 
WORKERS, LOCAL 41, 
eharging-Party; 
- and - CASE NO. U-24260 
TOWN OF EVANS, 
Respondent. 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SALISBURY & CAMBRIA, LLP 
(RICHARD D. FURLONG of counsel), for Charging Party 
SARGENT & COLLINS, LLP (RICHARD COLLINS of counsel), for 
) Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Evans (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that found the Town violated §§209-
a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused a 
request for information submitted by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 
Local 41 (IBEW) in order to prosecute a grievance. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's decision on various legal grounds addressed to 
the ALJ's dismissal of the Town's affirmative defenses. The IBEW filed its brief in 
response to the exceptions and in support of the ALJ's decision. 
) Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
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FACTS 
The Board adopts the ALJ's findings of fact but amends same to include, inter 
alia, the facts stipulated by the parties at the hearing held on August 14, 2003 and 
omitted from the ALJ's decision:1 
[Elmar] Kiefer was provided with charges . . . annexed to the 
[Answer]. The union filed a grievance contesting the discharge 
under the-terms-ofthe-parties-collective-bargaining-agreementand 
the Town denied the grievance and that the Union then duly, under 
the terms of the agreement, filed their Demand For Arbitration . . . 
[T]he Supervisor received the request for information . . . [P]rior to 
the filing of the charge, the Town's conduct amounted to a refusal 
to turn over the information.2 
The charge alleged in substance that the Town terminated Kiefer's employment 
on or about April 10, 2003. Kiefer was employed as the Town's Accountant and, by 
letter dated April 10, 2003, he was informed of the six charges that resulted in the 
Town's decision. 
The Town filed an answer that sets forth six affirmative defenses. The first 
affirmative defense asserts that, under §§75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law, a public 
employee has no right to discovery. The parties' collective bargaining agreement omits 
any procedure for discovery in the grievance article. The second affirmative defense 
asserts that the request for information is not a request for information in furtherance of 
negotiations between the parties. The third affirmative defense contains the parties' 
entire agreement as to "how grievances in a discipline matter are to be filed, processed 
and resolved." The fourth affirmative defense asserts that the request is a "blunderbuss 
demand". The fifth affirmative defense asserts that the demand seeks information that 
1
 37 PERB 1J4514 (2004). 
2
 Transcript, pp. 13-15. 
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does not exist or is not yet fully developed. The last affirmative defense alleges that the 
information sought is "privileged." 
IBEW's request is fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. IBEW's request for 
information mirrored the Town's six charges which formed the basis for Kiefer's 
termination from employment. 
-AMhe-hearing-held-on~AugusM47-20037the-parties-put-the-eharge-and4he ——-- — 
answer, with exhibits, into the record. The parties called no witnesses and agreed to 
submit the charge to the ALJ upon the pleadings and stipulation. The ALJ found a 
violation of §§209-a.1. (a) and (d) of the Act. 
DISCUSSION 
We recently decided a case with issues similar to that raised in the instant case. 
In County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff? the employment of a deputy sheriff was 
terminated. The disciplinary charge there involved sexual harassment. The union 
requested information in order to process the deputy's grievance. The County argued 
that the information sought was confidential. We held that, upon demand, a public 
employer must provide information that is relevant and necessary for the administration 
of a collective bargaining agreement, including the investigation of grievances. This 
obligation is not without limits. It is limited by the necessity and relevancy of the 
information sought, the reasonableness of the request, considering the burden on the 
employer, and the availability of the information elsewhere. The ALJ here found that the 
Town's refusal to provide the requested information constituted a violation of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act. We agree. 
3
 36 PERB 1J3021 (2003) (petition for review pending). See also International Union of 
Operating Engrs., Local 409, 36 PERB 1J3034 (2003) (petition for review pending). 
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The Town's threshold exception argues that the parties bargained for the rights 
and immunities embodied in §§75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law. This argument lacks 
merit. The charge draws its essence from the Act and not the parties' agreement. The 
Town's second exception contends that IBEW's demand "was not tailored to seek truly 
relevant and material information". The disclosure of material relevant to a grievance 
prior-to-arbitration-enablesa-union-to-make-an-informed deeision-of4he-merits-of-its-
claim and, thus, determine the appropriate action to take. In so doing, it also compels a 
public employer to weigh the strength of its case. The public interest is served by the 
timely resolution of grievances and discriminating use of public time and expense. 
The Town's third exception argues that the ALJ's dismissal of the fifth affirmative 
defense was error because IBEW information demand sought records and documents 
that do not exist and the Town was under no obligation to produce. The ALJ correctly 
observed that the IBEW's demand follows the reasons outlined in the Town's letter to 
Kiefer dated April 10, 2003. If the Town relied upon this information to support the 
reasons listed in its letter of April 10, 2003, the Town is under an obligation to provide it 
to IBEW in response to the demand and, therefore, the Town's reliance upon New York 
State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v. 
Kinsella, 197 AD2d 341, 27 PERB ^7006 (3rd Dep't 1994), is misplaced. The Court, in 
Kinsella, affirmed the Board's decision to dismiss Council 82's improper practice charge 
because it failed to prove that the State violated its bargaining obligation under the Act, 
when it refused requests to provide information that did not yet exist. 
The Town's fourth exception seeks to protect allegedly privileged information. 
The Town's response that it has no obligation to respond to the demand is incorrect. 
The Town's obligation is to explain fully and clearly the facts and circumstances upon 
Board - U-24260 - 5 
which the claimed exemption is based.4 It is the nature of the information demanded 
which is relevant to any privilege defense, not the reasons prompting the demand.5 
IBEW sought records and documents used by the Town to form the basis of the 
charges against Kiefer. The Town has the burden of demonstrating this information is 
exempt from disclosure as attorney work product, material prepared for litigation or 
eonfidential-based-upon-some-rule7-statute-or-Gase-lawT^"lt-is-fundamental-to4he-AGt 
that an employer's denial of a reasonable demand for information which is relevant to 
the adjustment of grievances interferes with a union's ability to represent the interests of 
the employees within its unit in violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act.7 
The Town's last exception complains that the ALJ erred by not conducting an in 
camera examination of the documents that were claimed to be privileged. We disagree. 
The New York Court of Appeals, in Cirale, opined that 
it will be the rare case that in camera determinations will be 
necessary. A description of the material sought, the purpose for 
which it was gathered and other similar considerations will usually 
provide a sufficient basis upon which the Court may determine 
whether the assertion of governmental privilege is warranted.8 
Here, the Town produced certain documents on the day of the hearing for the 
ALJ to review in camera and decide whether the material was privileged. The better 
4
 See CPLR 3103(a); CPLR 3122. (While the CPLR is not binding on PERB, reference 
to it is instructive as to procedural issues before us); 44A NY Jur 2d, Disclosure, §322. 
5
 City of Rochester, 29 PERB 1J3070 (1996). 
6
 See Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 35 NY2d 113 (1974) (all governmental information 
is not privileged and such information may not be withheld by a mere assertion of 
privilege. There must be specific support for the claim of privilege.). 
7
 Supra, note 6. 
Supra, note 7, at 119. 
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approach would have been to timely respond to IBEW's information request and 
specifically articulate its reasons for the claim of privilege. In so doing, it would have 
provided IBEW and the ALJ with a sufficient basis upon which to determine whether the 
Town's assertion of privilege was warranted. Since the Town admittedly refused to 
provide the information requested and the Town's answer failed to provide any 
guidanee4n-response-to-the4nformation-requested -other-t-ha-n-a-GonGlusopy-statemen-t-— 
that the information is "privileged or confidential or attorney's work product. . .," the 
Town failed to meet the minimum standards for disclosure of privileged information.9 
The Town's argument that IBEW was aware of the privileged nature of the information 
requested is irrelevant and unpersuasive. The Act imposes the duty to bargain in good 
faith. It was incumbent upon the Town to timely respond to IBEW's request and provide 
IBEW with its rationale for shielding the requested information from disclosure. If IBEW 
disagreed, and sought the assistance from the ALJ, it would have provided the ALJ with 
the opportunity to determine whether the Town's assertion of privilege was warranted. 
We find that the ALJ's refusal to engage in an in camera inspection of the requested 
records was not an abuse of discretion given the Town's refusal to provide any 
information or an explanation of its privileged character. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Town's exceptions and affirm the ALJ 
decision that the Town violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act and direct disclosure of 
the at-issue information. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town provide the IBEW information 
sought in its request of April 21, 2003. 
9
 Supra, note 5. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town post the attached notice at all 
locations used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
-^^^Int^dUiAjt-l^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Evans (Town) in the unit represented by 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 41 (IBEW) that the Town will 
provide the IBEW information sought in its request of April 21, 2003, and if the Town 
makes a claim that it is not in possession of the requested information, it shall explain to 
the IBEW the basis for the claim of non-possession, make a good faith effort to obtain the 
information sought, investigate alternate sources and communicate to the IBEW the 
results of those efforts. 
Dated By . . . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF EVANS 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
lefaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
- and - CASE NO. M2003-310 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE 
of counsel), for Employer 
KEVIN S. CASEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State) to a 
ruling of the Director of Conciliation (Director) in conjunction with impasse proceedings 
initiated by the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) under §209.3 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and Part 205 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). Council 82 has 
filed a response to the State's exceptions to the Director's determination that an 
impasse exists between the parties and the Director's appointment of a mediator. 
The State contends that the Director erred in appointing a mediator because the 
State is ready, willing and able to continue negotiations. The State argues that Council 
82 refuses to negotiate. In support of this argument, the State argues that the Director 
failed to consider the difficulty of the issues, that the State filed an improper practice 
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charge against Council 82 alleging its failure to negotiate in good faith, and that the 
Director failed to meet with the respective parties or invite the State to submit a 
response to Council 82's declaration of impasse. 
Council 82 argues in response to the State's exceptions that §205.13 of the 
Rules mandates that the Board appoint a mediator to assist the parties to effect a 
voluntaiy-resolution-of-their-collective-ne 
15, 2004, appointing a mediator, notes that the "matter has been under investigation for 
purposes of determining . . . whether... the parties might mutually desire to return to 
the table for further voluntary negotiations," but, instead, the State filed an improper 
practice charge against Council 82.1 Lastly, Council 82 contends that it is within the 
mediator's discretion to suspend mediation assistance, if, in the opinion of the mediator, 
the parties' would be better served by meeting on their own. 
The State's exceptions seek a review of the Director's determinations involving 
the dispute resolution provisions of the Act and Rules.2 In the instant matter, the 
Director determined that the parties negotiations were at impasse,3 which warranted the 
appointment of a mediator. The courts of New York have upheld our jurisdiction to 
1
 The charge was assigned Case No. U-24734. A conference was held on April 5, 2004 
and thereafter the parties were advised that further processing of the charge would 
await the outcome of the Board's decision here. 
2
 See City of New York, 34 PERB 1J3033 (2001); Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist of 
the City of New York, 34 PERB 1J3016 (2001). 
3
 Pursuant to §209.1 of the Act, an impasse may be deemed to exist if the parties fail to 
achieve agreement at least 120 days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the public 
employer. 
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,-~^ assist parties in the resolution of disputes during collective negotiations.4 The Court in 
Schenectady v. Helsby^ declared that: 
in order to effectuate the purpose and intent of the Taylor Law, 
subdivision 1 of Section 209 must be given a construction that 
does not render PERB powerless by preventing it from 
intervening when there is an "in fact" impasse, if not an impasse 
as defined in said subdivision 1 of section 209. 
M"ere7on~Decemberii720037eouncil~82-filed-a declaration-ofimpasse-with-PERB-after-
approximately 21 bargaining sessions and the passage of more than eight months since 
the expiration of the parties' most recent collective bargaining agreement. On March 
15, 2004, when the Director informed the parties that he was appointing a mediator to 
this impasse, almost one year had elapsed since the expiration of the parties' 
agreement. 
Having reviewed the facts and arguments submitted by the State, we confirm the 
; ) 
designation of a mediator by the Director in this matter. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
4
 See City of Newburgh v. PERB, 97 AD2d 258 (3rd Dep't 1983), affd, 63 NY2d 793 
(1984); City of Schenectady v. Helsby, 57 Misc2d 91 Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 
(1968). 
) 5
 City of Schenectady, supra, note 4, at 93. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitionee 
-and-
SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
SACHEM SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sachem School District Employees Union 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named 
^The petitioner sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the 
negotiating representative. 
CASE NO. C-5359 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
Included: All full and part time Custodial Workers, Head Custodian, Chief 
Custodian, Groundsmen, Athletic Groundskeeper, Head Groundsmen, 
Maintenance Mechanic, Automobile Mechanic, Driver/Messenger, 
Console Operator, Bus Driver, Bus Monitor, Cook, Supervisory Cook, 
Excluded: All Clericals, Administrators, Teachers, Paraprofessionals, Directors, 
Nurses, Security Personnel, and all other employees of the district not 
employed in the categories expressly set forth in the included above. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Sachem School District Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
y/yf 
/ Marc A.^Abbott, Member 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PLAINVIEW-OLD BETHPAGE CONGRESS OF 
TEACHERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5357 




INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, LOCAL 237, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding17 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
-The petitioner sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the 
negotiating representative. 
Certification - C-5357 Page 2 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 237 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances: 
Included: Cafeteria Aides, Teacher Aides, Library Aides, Recreation Aides, 
Computer Aides, Special Education Aides, Bus Monitors. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 237. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petit JO n er, ; 
-and- CASE NO. C-5353 
HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
HEMPSTEAD SCHOOL CIVIL SERVICE 
ASSOCIATION, NEA-NY, NEA, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding17 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hempstead School Civil Service Association, 
NEA-NY, NEA has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
) 
-The petitioner sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the 
negotiating representative. 
Certification - C-5353 page 2 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances: 
Included: All non-teaching employees. 
Excluded:—Director-olSecurity,-Director-olEood-Services,_.Sup.erintendent's 
Secretary , Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum 
and Instruction, Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent for Business 
(or the Business Manager), Secretary to the Associate Superintendent 
for Human Resources, Custodial-Maintenance employees, Teaching 
Assistant employees, three confidential (non-bargaining unit) personnel 
in the Human Resources/Personnel Department, and Substitute 
Employees in Food Service employed four months or less. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Hempstead School Civil Service Association, NEA-NY, 
NEA. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
^Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Jo/in T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
, Petitionee '-
-and- CASE NO. C-5370 
FAMILY LIFE ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Teachers has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and part-time teachers, including the Special Education 
Teacher Support Services (SETSS) Teacher, the Special 
Education Coordinator, teaching assistants and teaching fellows. 
Excluded: Principal, Educational Director, Operations Manager and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Teachers. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 26, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
///l. /] ASM-
/ Marc A/Abbott^Membver 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
